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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

Senobaugh v. State, Texas, 244 S. W. 379. Defenses. Statute justifying
homicide by husband on person of one taken in adultery with the
wife no
defense to indictment for aggravated assault upon the paramour.
The Texas Penal Code 1911, Art. 1102, provides that homicide is justifiable
when committed by the husband upon the person of anyone taken in
the act of
adultery with the wife provided the killing takes place before the parties
to the
act have separated. Defendant in the principal case instead of
killing the
paramour detected in adultery expressly showed an intention not
to kill, but
made a grievious assault upon and maimed him. Defendant was convicted
of
aggravated assault, but contended that he had a defense under the statute.
The
court held it no defense although had the assault resulted in death
or had it
been made with the intent and in an attempt to kill the paramour
the court
thought there would be a defense. But the intent to kill being negatived
by the
facts, the statute was no defense to an action for aggravated assault.
While
this decision reaches the somewhat incongruous result that an act which
would
have been lawful had it resulted in death or had it been accompanied
with an
attempt and intent to kill is nevertheless unlawful when not accompanied
by
death or an attempt to kill, nevertheless it is within the power of the
legislature
to so provide and it is submitted that this construction of the Statute
is sound.
At common law the rule was well sttled that detecting one-in the
act of
adultery with the wife was no justification for killing the paramour
although it
might reduce the crime to manslaughter. (4 BI. Comm. 191; 2 Bishop
Crim Law
(7th Ed.) 708. Statutes in some states, however, have been enacted
making it
justifiable homicide to kill the paramour in the heat of passion caused
by the
attempt of another to rape or otherwise defile (which would include
adultery)
wife, daughter, sister or other family relation or when the defilement
has actually been committed. (21 Cyc., p. 794, Notes 49 and cases cited.
Such statutes, of which the one in the principal case is merely typical,
being
in derogation of the common law rule and extending leniency have
been strictly
construed and have not been interpreted so as to include any other-kind
of killing than embraced in the words of the Statute. Thus in the Utah
case of
People v. Halliday, 5 Utah 467, 17 Pac. 122, the court in construing
a statute
justifying homicide by the husband in a sudden heat of passion caused
by the
defilement or attempt to defile made it plain that the statute includes
only
killings without any deliberation and that "if the husband, after learning those
of the
defilement of the wife waits and deliberates and then kills the defiler-the
crime
is murder." So in the principal case it would seem that the proper
construction
of the statute would be to make justifiable only those acts specifically
mentioned
in the Statute and not to make it include any other act which, in the
opinion of
the court, might be lesser and, therefore, included under the greater
permission
to kill under the circumstances. As before stated it might seem rather
incongruous that a husband might have killed without incurring liability,
but if he
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restrains himself and only administers a sound thrashing, he becomes liable for
criminal assault and battery, and yet conceivably if the other view were taken
that because the husband may kill he may also do any other acts short of
killing, the result would perhaps be more shocking, for the most inhuman tortures
might then be inflicted under the protection of the law, as perhaps was largely
true in the principal case. At any rate, in view of the common law rule (supra)
it is for the legislature to say exactly under what circumstances such killing
shall be justifiable and in the principal case the court has merely applied the
proper principle of statutory construction.
CONFESSIONS.

Stone v. State, 93 So. 706. Admissibility; duty of court to determine
voluntary character of confession.
While all the authorities are agreed that a confession to be admissible must
be voluntarily made, yet there is considerable difference of opinion as to whether
the question of its voluntary character must be finally determined by the court,
by the jury or in a preliminary way by the court at the time it is offered, but to
be again passed on ultimately by the jury. The principal case states what is
submitted to be the proper rule, namely, that the admissibility of confessions,
like the admissibility of any other evidence, is a proper question for the court
alone. That the court must, in the process, determine an incidental question of
fact is no objection, foi it is clear that such incidental determinations of fact do
not infringe upon the functions of the jury. Nor in so holding are we in any
way preventing the jury from being the sole and ultimate determiner of the
weight and credibility to be attached to the confession when once admitted.
The following cases have taken the view announced in the principal case:
Harrold v. Oklahoma, 169 Fed. 47, where the court held it error to submit the
question of voluntary character to the jury; State v. Spanos, Ore., 134 Pac. 6;
State v. Williams, Nev., 102 Pac. 974; Godau v. State, Ala., 60 So. 908; State v.
Berberick, Mont., 100 Pac. 209 (based on the Montant Statute).
In the following cases it has been held that while the court must pass in a
preliminary way upon the voluntary character of the confession before allowing
it to go to the jury, nevertheless once it has gone to the jury additional evidence
as to its voluntary character may be introduced and the jury may pass ultimately
on this matter as well as upon its credibility: Cont. v. Antaya, Mass., 68 N. E.
330; People v. Randazzio, N. Y., 87 N. E. 112; Clay v. State,'Wyo., 15 Wyo. 42,
86 Pac. 17; State v. Welts, Utah, 100 Pac. 681.
FALSE PRETENSES.

Carrol v. State, Alab., 94 So. 194. Defenses; duty of prosecutor to use
means at his disposal to detect falsity of the pretenses.
This case raised the question whether under an indictment for obtaining a
horse by false pretenses, the fact that the prosecutor had means of detecting the
falsity of the pretenses, but failed to use them would be a defense. It was
held that it would not be, Merritt, J., quoting with approval the language of the
court in Woodbury v. State, 69 Alab. 242, "Whether the prosecutor could have
avoided imposition from the false pretenses if he had exercised ordinary prudence and discretion to detect its falsity, is not a material inquiry." Unfortunately the alleged false pretenses in the principal case are not set out in the
opinion, hence it is impossible to tell whether the court takes the extreme posi-
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tion that absolutely on standard of care will be required on the part of the
prosecutor to safeguard himself from imposition or whether merely the pretences involved constituted an imposition in excess of that against which the
victim must safeguard himself. The problem, however, of whether any standard of case, and if so, what standard will be required of the victim before a
defendant may be guilty under the statutes is interesting.
Historically, the false pretense statutes were intended to widen the scope of
common law cheats, the essence of which was the employment of deceitful
symbols or tokens which affected the public at large and "against which common prudence could not have guarded." (Wharton's Criminal Law, 11th Ed.,
vol. II, par. 1378, and cases cited). Like the Embezzlement Statutes, they were
also intended to cover those cases where the taking of the property was with
the same intent as in larceny (Regina v. Kilhain Law Reports, 1 Crown Cases
Reserved 261, Beale's Cases on Criminal Law, 3rd Ed., p. 750), but could not be
dealt with as such because of the inability to make out the trespass. (7 and 8
Geo. IV, c. 29, Par. 53, recites "that a failure of justice frequently arises from
the subtle distinct between larceny and fraud," and by way of remedy enacts "if
any person shall by any false pretense obtain, etc.") Moreover the general language of the statutes both in England and this country provide against "obtaining
property by any false pretense." (25 C. J., p. 598, note 71, and cases cited. Eng.
Stat. 24 and 25 Vict., c. 96, par. 88. "By any false pretense.") Thus, the historical
purpose of the statutes and their literal construction would indicate that the
essential inquiry in any case is whether or not the victim has actually been
defrauded and not whether a reasonable man under the circumstances or any
other artificially standardized being would have been misled. This seems at
present to be the clear weight of authority both in England (in Regina v. Wickham, Lord Denman Ch. J.,in reply to the suggestion that the false pretense in
order to be the subject of indictment should be such as would deceive a man
of ordinary intelligence, said "I never could see why that should be." For later
Eng. Cases, note 3, p. 1632, Wharton's Cr. Law, l1th ed., Vol. II) and the
United States (Com. v. Beckett, 84 S. W. 758, 68 L. R. A. 638; 25 C. J., p. 598,
note 77; People v. Smith, 84 Pac. 449 (Cal.)). In the language of the New
Jersey Court, "The law (against false pretenses) are made to protect weakminded and credulous as well as sagacious persons. The wise and wary can
protect themselves." (Oxx v. State, 59 N. J. L. 99, 101, 35 Atl. 646.) While the
foregoing represents the present prevailing view, the opposite view laying down
a reasonable man standard and that if the prosecutor has at his disposal means
of detecting the falsity of the pretense, but fails to use them, the crime cannot
be made out, has been taken in some jurisdictions. (See the language of Soule
in Com. v. Harkins, 128 Mass. 79; People v. Williams, Hill 9 (N. Y.) 40 Am.
Dec. 258 (1842), the head note to this case reading: "A representation though
false is not within the statute unless calculated to mislead persons of ordinary
prudence and caution." State , Estes, 46 Me. 150; Com. v. Hutchinson, 1 Clark
(Pa.) 302; De Laney v. State, 7 Baxter 28), and in early'cases in some of the
jurisdictions which now refuse to set a reasonable man standard. (Compare
Corn. v. Grady, 13 Bush 285, 26 Amer. Rep. 192, with Com. v. Beckett, 119 Ken.
817, 84 S. W. 758. The former Kentucky case, however, may be readily explained by the theory (post) that the pretense involved did not really mislead
and it is upon this ground distinguished in the latter case.)
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In Corn. v. Drew, 19 Pick. 179 (Mass.)

(1937), the court said, in a case

where the defendant presented to the bank a check which overdrew his account:
"but there must be some limit and it would seem to be unreasonable to extend
it (false pretense Statute) to those who, having the means in their own hands,
neglect- to protect themselves."
It is generally said, however, that even in those jurisdictions which take the
position that the actual imposition on the victim is the gist of the offense under
the statutes and which refuse to set a standard such as would be calculated to
deceive a reasonably prudent man, the courts nevertheless set the limitation that
the pretense must not be absurd, incredible or irrational and that if it is so the
conviction cannot be maintained. A close examination of these cases, however,
reveals the fact that what many of these cases really decide is that the alleged
pretenses involved were so absurd, incredible or irrational that they really did not
mislead dr defraud the prosecutor (i. e.) were not the proximate cause of the
deprivation of the property. (State v. Crane, 38 Pac. 270 (Kans.) ; Walker v.
The State, 67 So. 94 (where the physical boundaries of the land sold by defendant and represented as containing ten acres, but which actually were clearly
pointed out to the prosecutor). The court said, "It (the pretense), even if
false, must have been perfectly apparent to the prosecutor." Clark v. State,
72 So. 291 (Ala.), where the court says, "The representation . . . may or
may not have been cogent and controlling in inducing Hill to act in the premises.
However, these were jury questions." It would seem, therefore, on principle
that while care should be taken, in determining whether or not the pretense
involved is so irrational, incredible or absurd as to actually mislead the prosecutor, nevertheless the irrationality, absurdity or incredibility should bear solely
on this fact of whether the prosecutor has actually been misled or defrauded and
where it once appears that he has, then the language of the court in State v.
Woodbury cited in the principal case (supra) that "Whether the prosecutor
could have avoided imposition from the false pretense if he had exercised ordinary prudence and discretion-is not a material inquiry."
FALSE PRETENSE.

Dill v. State, Neb., 191 N. W. 646. Obtaining extension of credit by false
pretenses.
Defendant had lawfully secured credit to the extent of $104.48 for certain
merchandise purchased and then, by false pretenses relating to certain chattels
which he offered to give as collateral security, secured an extension of the credti.
Held that this did not fall within the statute making unlawful the obtaining
credit by false pretenses. The credit having been secured lawfully originally,
could not he made unlawful by fraudulently securing an extension, and the
fraudulent extension not being embraced in the statute, there was no crime.
FALSE PRETENSES.

Corscott v. State, Wisc. Representation. Words in form of promise may
under circumstances.amount to representation of existing fact.
The defendant had had prior business dealings with the complaining witness
in the course of which he had negotiated a loan secured by a certificate of stock
in the Madison Square Company. About six months later defendant attempted
to make another loan, saying that he had immediate need of the money and that
he would give her some more of the same stock as security.
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Defendant then left and shortly thereafter returned and, handing the victim
an envelope, said: "The stock and note are in there." Some time later it was
discovered that the stock securing the note was not stock of the Madison Square
Company, but of the Starck Company, which was worthless. Held in the principal case that while the words, "I will give you some more of the same stock"
were in form of a promise relating to future events, nevertheless when viewed
in light of all the circumstances and the later statement: "The stock and note
are in these," which was part of the same transaction, "it can have but one
meaning and that is that when the security was actually delivered it meant:
I am giving you some more of the same stock (meaning the Madison Square
Company Stock)." This constituted a representation of an existing fact and
was sufficient to satisfy this requirement of the crime of false pretense.
It is submitted that the case is correct. While the rule is clear to the effect
that the representation relied upon must be of past or existing fact and not a
mere promise of future acts or events. (Clark Criminal Law, 363 (Mikell's
Third Ed.), People v. Blanchard,90 N. Y. 314; Corn v. Moore, 99 Pa. St. 570.)
Nevertheless it is also a well settled principle that no particular kind of representation is necessary to constitute the offense, and that a false pretense may be
made by conduct or actions even without words. (Rex. v. Barnard, 7 Car. & P.
784 (person fraudulently wearing a cap and gown leading tradesmen to believe
he was a commoner in Oxford College.) Reg. v. Goss, 8 Cox Cr. C. 262 (showing false samples) ; giving a check on a certain bank held to be a representation that defendant kept an account at the bank (Foote v. People, 17 Hun. 218) ;
Contra: Martin v. State, 35 S. W. 976) or a representation may be made in connection with spoken words, and even when a promise constitutes part of the
inducement. (Thomas v. State, 90 Ga. 437, 16 S. E. 94; where defendant represented that he had already made a sale of certain property and promising
prosecutor with a certain sum out of it; State v. Fooks, 65 Iowa 196, 21 N. W.
561. A representation that defendant's brother was to arrive with money coupled
with a promise to use it in payment of the sum borrowed amounts to a pretense
that he had the money-; see also Com. v. Moore, 89 Ken. 542, 12 S. W. 1066.
Smith v. State, 42 S. E. 766 (Ga.) ; State v. Briggs, 86 Pac. 447 (Kans.)). In
any event it would seem that inasmuch as representations may be communicated
through a member of media ("false pretense, being a misrepresentation, may
be made in any of the ways (or by a combination of ways) in which ideas may
be communicated from one person to another," per Curiam in Commonwealth v.
Drew v. Pick, 179 Mass.) that all of these things constituting the entire transaction should be taken together in determining whether a representation has
been made, and the time of fact represented (i. e.) whether past, present or
prospective should likewise be determined not by an isolated statement in the
conversation, but by the sum total of the representation making media constituting the whole transaction. It would also seem to be well established in the law
that mere words inconsistent with the overt acts and conduct of a party can
never determine the character or legal effect of those acts and tonduct. And
so in the principal case the mere fact that the defendant used the future tense,
which, if taken as a purely isolated statement, would only be a promise, yet his
other acts and conduct in that same transaction accompanied by the statement
that "the stock and note are in there," which in view of the whole transaction
could only mean the stock referred to in the prior promise, all together clearly
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made a representation of 'an existing fact, which, together with its falsity and
the reliance thereon, completed the crime.
HomIcIDE.
Thacker v. Commonwealth, Va., 114 S. E. 504. Attenpt to murder; specific
intent.
The facts showed that the prosecutor with her children were sleeping in a
tent in which they were camping out during the summer; a lighted lamp was
left on a trunk near the head of the bed in expectation of the husband's return
that evening. Defendant, who was intoxicated, passing along the road near the
tent, saw the light and said he was going to shoot "that God damned light out,"
and later, after learning of the presence of the prosecutor and her children in
the tent, the defendant recklessly shot three times, two shots passing through the
tent, one passing through the head of the bed in which the prosecutor was lying
and narrowly missing her head and the head of a child sleeping with her.
Held: that the crime of an attempt to murder was not made out, because of a
lack of the requisite intent.
To constitute the crime of attempt it is usually said that the following elements must appear:
(1) The act must fail of completion. (2) Must come sufficiently near success to warrant apprehension and action on the part of the state. (3) Acts done
must be apparently adapted to accomplish the results sought. (4) the act
intended must, if completed, be a criminal offense. (5) There must be a specific
intent to commit the particular crime at the time of the act. (Clark Criminal
Law, 3rd Ed., p. 138.)
It is at once apparent that the facts of the principal case satisfy the first
three requirements but fall entirely to satisfy the fourth and fifth. The act
intended, and the only one supported by the evidence as being intended, was to
extinguish the light, which had it entirely succeeded would not constitute a
crime. True it is that in attempting to accomplish this purpose the defendant
acted with wantonness and gross negligence and with an utter disregard for
human life; he used a means which was most reasonably adapted to the killing
of human beings, and it came dangerously near bringing about that result, and
had it actually brought about the death of a human being there would undoubtedly have been the crime of murder, the requisite intent being supplied by the
defendant's knowledge that in so acting he is likely to cause the death or serious
bodily injury to some person. Thus in Pool v. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S. E. 556, it
was said that the intentional firing of a pistol into a crowded street resulting in
the death of a person in the street was murder even though the defendant had
no actual intent to kill the person so killed, for the law implies an actual intention to kill from the mere wantonness of the act. (Bailey v. State, 32 So. 57
(Ala.); Brown v. Com., 11 S. W. 220; State v. Edwards, 71 Mo. 312.) The
rule is well settled that the intent necessary to make out the crime of murder
may be implied from the wantonness and gross negligence of the act and the
defendant's act in the principal case had it resulted in death would come within
this rule. But a substantive crime not having ensued, the authorities are well
settled that the specific intent to do the act which is alleged to have been
attempted cannot be implied from the wantonness or gross negligence of the
act, even though had death resulted, the substantive crime of murder would
have been made out. (See Clark Criminal Law (3rd Ed.), p. 148; Bishop Crim-
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inal Law, vol. 1 (8th Ed.), Secs. 729 and 730, cited in the principal case. Brown
v. State, 27 Tex. App. 330, 11 S. W." 412, "It (attempt) cannot be founded on
Hence in the California case of Pbople v. Mize,
mere general malevolence.")
22 Pac. 10, it was held error to instruct "if the testimony showed, that had the
prosecuting witness been killed, one of the defendants would have been guilty
of murder, then that one should be convicted," for "in the crime of attempt to
murder the intent is an essential ingredient and must be proved," and in the
Louisiana case of State v. Evans, 3 So. 63, it was held error to instruct the
jury "where the evidence shows that it' would have been murder if death had
ensued, that in itself will be sufficient ground for the jury to infer the existence
of the intention to murder."
The decision of the principal case, then, namely, that the specific intent
required in the crime of attempt cannot be implied from circumstances which,
merely because had they resulted in death, would supply the intent. requisite.to
make out the crime of murder, would seem to be in accord with a well recognized
rule.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Giles v. United States, N. H., 284 Fed. 208. Evidence illegally obtained;
evidence obtaived by veans of search warrant improperly issued not admissible.
In the first case to come before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit involving the use of search warrants under the National Prohibition
Act in obtaining evidence of its -violation, it was held that where the warrant
was issued on affidavit of the enforcement officer and from the affidavit it did
not appear affirmatively that the affiant had personal knowledge of competent
evidence for a prosecution under the Act, and where the premises to be searched
were not specifically described in the warrant and where, therefore, the issuing
of the warrant was illegal under the Statute (tit. 11, 40 Stat. 228) evidence
obtained by the use of such a defective warrant was inadmissible in a prosecution for a violation of the National Prohibition Act. In so holding the court
was merely applying the rule prevailing in the Supreme and Federal Courts
establishedj by the much criticized case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
6 Sup. Ct. 524. Professor Wigmore, in a recent article in the American Bar
Association Journal, Vol. 8, No. 8, p. 840, criticizing the prevailing Federal
Court rule, refers to it (the Boyd case) as the "ill-starred majority opinion
which has exercised unhealthy influence upon subsequent judicial opinion in
many states."
The majority rule in the state courts, however, is clear to the effect that
evidence obtained by illegal seizure is nevertheless admissible (see 136 Am. St.
Rep. 129 for an exhaustive note and collection of authorities; Greenleaf on
Evidence (Lewis' Ed., vol. 1, par. 254a; Wigmore Evidence, par. 2183) and as
typical of the reaction to the so-called Federal rule is the recent case of State v.
Tonn, Ia., 191 N. W. 530, which, in a prosecution under the Iowa Criminal
Syndicalism Law, involved the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained without warrant. The court in that case said it was squarely confronted with the
proposition "of whether or not we will continue to follow the Supreme Court
of the United States in the rule of the Boyd case." The court decided not to
follow it, but admitted the evidence.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS
CHILDREN.

State v. Hawkins, S. Car., 114 S. E.,538.

Child's incapacity not measured

by iental age.
On trial of a criminal case, the presumption of incapacity to commit
crime, arising from evidence that defendant has the mentality of one under
14 years of age, obtains only when it has been shown that the defendant has
not lived 14 years.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

U. S. v. Lauza, 43 Sup. Ct. Repr. 141. Prosecution under National Prohibition Act after conviction under state statute.
An act which was made an offense both by the state prohibition law and
by the National Prohibition Act is an offense against each sovereignty, and
may be punished by each without violating Const. U. S. Amend. 5, prohibiting double jeopardy, which applies only to proceedings by the federal government, and forbids only a second prosecution under the authority of the
federal government after a first trial for the same offense under the same
authority.
HoMICIDE.

State v. Ehlers, N. J., 119 Atl. 15. Motive: killing child to prevent suffering.
A man (unless not sufficiently sane to know the quality and nature of
the act, or that it was wrong) who kills his seven-year-old child to save it
from anticipated future suffering and unhappiness is guilty of murder in the
first degree if the killing be willful, premeditated, and deliberate, although
.actuated only by motives of pure, even if mistaken, love and kindness.
HOMuICIDE.

State v. Ehlers, N. J., 119 Atl. 15. Use of miental age tests for adults.
Expert testimony that an adult defendant in a trial for murder is of a
mental age of only 12 years, coupled with the further testimony by the same
expert that 12 years was also the average mental age of our American soldiers
in the World War, and that the mental age theory "does not amount to
shucks" so far as adults are concerned, commented on as tending to demonstrate that the mental age theory of the medical experts is, at least as applied
to adults, based upon so arbitrary and unnatural a scale of years as a standard as to be misleading to a layman, and useless, if not worse than useless,
in the administration of justice by trial by jury.
HOMICIDE.

State v. Bowers, S. Car., 115 S. E. 303. Duty to retreat.
One assaulted in his own house is not required to retreat before exercising his right of self-defense, and a man's place of business is his house
within the meaning of that rule.

A requested charge that a man assaulted -in his place of business need
not retreat before exercising his right of self-defense was not covered by the
general charge stating the law as applied to a man's house, and adding that
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it had been argued that the rule applied also to his place of business, but
not so charging as a proposition of law except by implication.
Gary, C. J., and Fraser, J., dissenting.
HOMICIDE.

Pierce v. Commionwealth, Va., 115 S. E. 686. Murder by use of spring gul.
Where a spring gun was set in a building not a private dwelling with
the intention that it would take the life of anyone attempting to force an
entrance therein, and a homicide resulted, the person setting the gun could
be convicted of murder in the second degree.
Evidence that accused, whose store had previously been feloniously
entered, had set therein a spring gun in such a manner as to discharge its
load into the body of anyone attempting to open the door, and had failed to
warn the policeman, who patrolled that beat, of the presence of the gun,
though he knew such policeman tried the door to see if it was locked, as a
result of which a policeman was killed on a night when the door had been
left unlocked, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of murder in the second
degree.
INDICTMENT.

State v. Portee, S. Car., 115 S. E. 238. Charging murder by use of automobile.
An indictment for murder by striking deceased with plaintiff's automobile, although reciting that accused "did make an assault" with his automobile and did "run against, strike, throw to the ground, run over, crush,
bruise and wound" deceased, held not objectionable as charging three or
more.distinct offenses, under Cr. Code 1912, Sec. 87, as to indictment for
murder.
In trial for murder by running into deceased with automobile, a charge
that "implied malice is such as you have a right to infer from the use of a
deadly weapon, as in this case, you have a right to infer malice from the
reckless handling of a dangerous instrumentality until the circumstances
show that it was not of that character," held not erroneous as a charge on
the facts; it being the apparent intention of the trial court simply to charge
the jury that it was for them to draw the inference from the testimony, as
to implied malice, in the instant case.
INDICTMENT.

State v. Nunn, Wash., 210 Pac. 771. Sufficiency.
An information charging defendant with transporting with intent to sell
five sacks of whisky held not void, a sack meaning a measure of quantity or
a receptacle of some pliable material, as cloth, leather, or the like, for holding and carrying goods of any kind, and, in absence of a showing of prejudice, an objection thereto first made on appeal came too late.
INSTRUCTION.

State v. Tisehler, N. J., 119 Atl. 372. Error to charge that verdict should
be based on rules of logic and estimates of probability.
In a prosecution for assault with intent carnally to abuse a female under
the age of 16, where prosecutrix testified as to the circumstance of the
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assault, which defendant denied, an instruction that, if state's witnesses were
to be believed, the crime was made out, and, if the defense was believed,
defendant is not guilty. "Who is telling the truth? Which is the more
logical, the more probable story? That, after all, is the real question," and
"within your province"-was harmful error, requiring reversal.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

People v. Graff, Calif. D. C. A., 211 Pac. 829. Wife can embezzle husband's
property.
Notwithstanding Pol. Code, Sec. 4468, which provides that the common
law, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the United States
Constitution or the constitution or laws of this state, is the rule of decision
in all courts of this state, and in view of Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1881, providing that neither husband nor wife can be a witness against the other
without consent, except' for a crime committed by one against the other,
Pen. Code, Secs. 26, 1322, providing that all persons are capable of committing crimes, except, inter alia, married women (except for felonies) acting
under coercion of their husbands, and that neither is a competent witness
against the other in a criminal action, except in case of a crime committed
by one against the person or property of the other, "any person," "every
person," and "a person" as used in Pen. Code, Secs. 470, 503, 506, 507, defining embezzlement and forgery to include, in substance, both husbands and
wives, hence a motion to quash an indictment against a wife for embezzlement and forgery concerning the property of her husband was improperly
granted.
"The question whether a wife may offend against the property of her
husband through a commission of the crimes of embezzlement and forgery
has never been passed upon, apparently, in any jurisdiction. Courts of last
resort in several of the states have had before them, however, the question
whether one spouse may commit larceny of the effects of the other, or may
commit other crimes, notably arson, against the property of the other, with
the result that the authorities upon the question are divided. In those cases
in which it has been determined that the crimes mentioned may not be committed by one spouse against the other the courts have descanted upon the
sanctity of the marriage relation as the foundation upon which a stable
condition of society can alone exist. The view is taken that the peace of
the home will be destroyed if husbands and wives may be charged with the
commission of crimes against the property of each other, and it is said that
it were better to permit the escape from punishment of a husband or wife
who robs a spouse than to encourage the dissention which would enter a
family if a criminal charge could be pressed against the thief. It is said in
effect that the commission of such a theft would have a slight tendency to
produce a warfare internecine to the family, while the pressure of a criminal
charge because of the immoral act would tend to cause a disruption of the
marital relation. We cannot adopt such a line of reasoning. We cannot
believe that such events can be so smothered in the family circle that no
ripple, or that but a slight ripple, will disturb the serenity of the home. A
spouse will not lightly forgive a robbery committed against him by his
marital partner, and a home in which one of the partners will steal the prop-
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erty of the other cannot be regarded as one resting on a particularly solid
foundation.
"In passing upon the question involved in this appeal we cannot but
contemplate the effect upon society if our decision should be favorable to
respondent. Such a termination of the cause would advertise to the world
the fact that wives may rob their husbands with impunity, that they may
commit against their husbands inherently immoral acts which if committed
by them against others, or if committed by others against their husbands,
would bring down condign punishment upon the offender under the laws
denouncing the serious crimes of embezzlement and forgery. Such a conclusion on our part could not but encourage and multiply the commission of
such acts, thus bringing into some households at least the very strife and
dissension which it is the purpose of some of the decided cases to prevent,
through arguments unconvincing, unsound, and illogical."
JURISDICTION.

United States v. Bowman, 43 Sup. Ct. Repr. 39. Statute punishing false
claims applied to vessels of U. S. on high. seas or in foreign ports.
Criminal Code, Sec. 35, as amended by Act Oct. 23, 1918 (Comp. St.
Amn. Supp. 1919, Sec. 10199), .making it an offense to present a false claim
to the government, or any corporation in which the United States is a stockholder, etc., when construed with other sections of that chapter, is not limited
to the land jurisdiction of the United States, but extends to such frauds when
committed on vessels of the United-States on the high seas. or in foreign
ports, at least when committed by American citizens.
Notwithstanding the rule that criminal statutes are to be 'strictly construed, they must, like all other statutes, be fairly construed according to the
legislative intent, as expressed in the enactment.
It is no offense to the dignity or right of sovereignty of a foreign country to hold American citizens for a crime against the United States government, to which they owe allegiance, committed on vessels of the United
States in a port of such foreign country.
JURY.

People v. Garcia,Calif. D. C. A., 211 Pac. 58. Application to membership in
K. K. K. as disqualification to jurymem
In kidnapping prosecution, held that the fact that a deputy sheriff who
summoned the jurors and certain jurors Were applicants for membership in,
or members of, an organization called the "K. K. K.," was not ground for
challenge to the panel or individual members selected to compose the jury,
where examination did not disclose that their action would be influenced by
their obligation.
LARCENY.

State v. "Schoonover,Wash., 211 Pac. 756. Intoxicating liquor as subject of
larceny.
That intoxicating liquors are contraband under both state and national
laws does not prevent them from being the subject of larceny, though National Prohibition Act, tit. 2, Sec. 25, provides that no property rights shall
exist therein.
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Testimony that intoxicating liquor, which the evidence showed had a
ready sale and was in demand, had a market value in excess of the statutory
requirement for grand larceny, together with the fact that accused considered
it of sufficient value to justify its wrongful taking, held sufficient to make
the offense grand larceny, though, being outlawed by both state and national
laws, it had no value in the market overt for purposes of barter and sale.
PARENT AND CHILD.

State v. Bell, N. Car., 115 S. E. 190. "Husband"; abandonment by father of
children after divorce.
Under C. S., Sec. 4447, providing that any husband who willfully abandons his wife without providing adequate support for her, and the children
which he may have begotten upon her, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and in
view of sections 4448-4450, a husband, from whom the wife has obtained an
absolute divorce, is subject to prosecution for the abandonment of his children without providing adequate support for them.
Stacy and Walker, JJ., dissenting.
PAROLE.

Crook v. Sanders, Sup't of State Penitentiary, C. Car., 115 S. E. 760. Good
time allowance while on parole.
The word "parole," when construed in accordance with its etymology,
excludes the meaning of a suspended sentence, and implies that the prisoner
on parole is still in custody, though released from the bounds of prison.
Where petitioner for habeas corpus to secure his release from custody
after parole was revoked for misconduct, alleged that his time expired on
the date it would have expired if he had been entitled to his credit for good
behavior, thereby impliedly alleging he was entitled to such credit, and there
was no showing his conduct was not good prior to the revocation of his
parole five months after the expiration of his sentence, he is entitled to the
credit for good behavior, so that his sentence had expired before the parole
was revoked.
Gary, C. J., dissenting.
SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES.

State v. Myers, Ida., 211 Pac. 438. Recovery.of and'use of papers illegally
seized.
An application on behalf of a defendant in a criminal case to the trial
court for the return of papers illegally seized creates a collateral issue,
whether made prior to or at the time of the trial of the person against whom
such papers are sought to be introduced as evidence. A proceeding for the
recovery of such papers so taken is of a civil nature, and under our procedure is no part of a criminal action.
Evidence, if competent and relevant, is admissible, irrespeive of the
manner in which it was obtained. If a defendant in a criminal action is
entitled to the possession of papers which have been illegally seized and are
about to be used as evidence against him, he must seek his remedy in an
independent proceeding.
McCarthy, Dunn and Lee, JJ., dissenting.
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SUNDAY LAW.

Pirkey Bros. v. Commonwealth, Va., 114 S. E. 764. "Necessities."
The Sunday law (Code 1919, Sec. 4570) should be construed in the light
of the age in which we live, recognizing that there are things which the
community regard as necessary that were not "necessities" when the statute
was first enacted, and that, to escape the penalty pronounced by the statute,
the labor performed must be of the class excepted thereby or recognized by
the community as a necessity, and what is or is not a necessity is generally
a question for the jury in criminal prosecutions.
In a prosecution for violating the Sunday law (Code 1919, Sec. 4570),
by keeping open on Sunday a certain cave or grotto, charging admission fees
to tourists, and keeping the cave lighted up by electricity for the occasion, a
verdict of guilty will not be disturbed, since the question of whether the
work done was one of necessity in view of modern conditions of life was for
the jury, as one whereon reasonably fair-minded men might draw different
conclusions.
TRIAL.

Moore v. State, Ga., 115 S. E. 25. Absence of judge from court room during
trial.
Where during the trial of a capital case the presiding judge leaves the
court room, even for a few minutes, during the prosecuting attorney's argument to the jury, without suspending the trial, and at the conclusion of that
argumeni the defendant's counsel makes a motion for a mistrial because of
such absence, the motion should be granted.
TRIAL.

State v. Johnson, Wash., 210 Pac. 774. Inadvertent separation of .ury.
Where, during the trial for forgery, the jury was taken from the jury
room in charge of two bailiffs to witness a demonstration on the street, but
by error one juror was left in the jury room, which was locked, during which
time he did not see nor talk with anyone, held not such a separation of the
jury as to constitute error to the prejudice of accused.

